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'. Ol{. J. :L~Y S'UT:!, JR. 
ACrPJ3 C1.1\IR"iA.~, 
. F.;')U!\L ;:·1;'L'")Y":S J'r ()P?)~~J'Jrr'Y Co-·j '~I:-;'=';I)'J 
8SF0~ 'fHE 
JiJ'E 12, 10al 
m~C8'~T 0:>Ji~I.D!?,~'~~'J'r3 I'J S····l!?[/)Y\·i:.:·~'r 
'\·\rrI-DISC~I'·iI~A'rI-7·~ L!\ ''!S 
LadS". In addressing this b)L')ic, I ',Jill focus on sevI=ra 1 recent C'.)urt caS;:?5 t.hat 
"nay 113ve an i!l1;?::Ict on tile l,1ce3ent status of anti-discrL~in:ttion 13.Js. 'Jf ~~;Jrse, 
I :1:> not intend fur y~!.l to infer that th: cas:~s that I .lill ji~ci.lsS are t'le :>i1ly 
ne.l ,jevetJpnents 1n 8~) la.-Js. They ar2 j-.lst 51.yne of the ·')nes t~lat I think are 
A. :-'a.L'kh3.u v. ~:;e1IeLI 24 ;~PIJ pard'Jrapn 31,417 (211::'1 eire 19:3:» C:ert • .l'2:1iej 
I'he lS.5l..le ~rese:1t,?j in ··:ar~han v. Ce 112r ~}as .l!l-?ther 'ri tIe \/I I '.s j is?-= cat:? 
i~~).:ict theocy a~).:)lies to actions instituted under trt'= ,\ge niSC1:i·ni!13ti.:;n in 
y);itiJ:J ~t .1cf-2')l'::tnt's sch-::>ol. \t the ti';'\E' :,:>laintiff ·(.l35 55 Y'2-:1l:S 011. 
II Sxce?t in sLJecial situations and to the ex tE:nt £X)ssible, 
te·:ichers ne2·-]ed •••• vill Oe re-::cuited at I~Vt;IS ~2lovl the 
- sixth ste? of tho? salary sche'iule tl • 
The sixth step :.Jas the salary gra::3e reached by teachers .-/i th m:>re than 
five years experience. 
At trial :)laintiff intro-Juced eX9E?rt statistical testLrony estal:>lishing that 
~ f 
92.6% ':>f :'')nn2cticuti teachers bet . .Jeen 40 and 55 years old ~ave iTI.Jre tn.3n 5 
jGars ex~?-rience, '~'Jhilf= only 62% of teachers unner 40 have tau.]~1t ~~ore than 
five :fears: nence; the basis of plaintiff's claim of adverse im?3ct. 
rne c.,)urt ruled that the "su::'stantive lJrohibitions of the :\J)E/\ • .:ere j·~rived 
in l-Jaec ver;.)a fru1\ Title VIlli. AlthoLl~h the t\DS.~ did not aJopt ::ritle JII's 
?rocej~ral rules entirely, the rule per~ni tting a case to be esta')l ished by a 
sho~ling of discri:ninatory Lnpact, ruled the court, is suost3ntive. Therefore, 
Title \11 I , s disparate Ln.?act theory _llust ~ read into the .\D8Z\. 
On 7\9ril 27th of this j2dr, t!)e Uni ted States Su:)re:ne Court ::)eni'?-:1 cert. 
in ··iar:~11afl v. Geller, over a strong dissent by Justice ~<-2h:1 l'Jist. Justice 
Kehn-1uist stated: 
"In lly opinion, the .i-=cisi~n of ti1e Court of ~~)~:>eals is inc.:>nsistent -,;i th 
the express ~Jrovisions of the lillS.!\ an= is not sLl:)?:>rt,:?d by any prior 
~1ecision of [the Supreme Court]. 'rhe AI)S.l\ :nakes it unla'./ful for any 
eiTI:.)l::>yer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual 
or ::>ther./ise ']iscci~ninate a·:Jai:1st any injivid!Jal ~vi t!1 resfY=ct to his 
c:rfl .. >2i1.3ation, ter,ns, conditio:ls, or privileges of ernpl:::>YT!ent, bec;3use 
;:,f such inc1hTidi.lal's age. T~)e ~licy In::1er attac~ in ti)is case, 
no.lever, :na!{es n::> ceiec'?oce to a~e. For ~)uj':3etary rea50~s, a sCi100l 
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In my Vlev'l, COn]r8SS :lid ;-lot inten:! tne \DC:\ to nave the restrain in'] 
infL.lence on iCC::!l -jove:rn.ill?nts .Jhic!1 .Jill r-esult fr().n t:l': JeL:ision ;)elo·.v • 
.con::!ress revealed .this intention [by the :;>L":Jvision of the ADEA] 'w:-lich ;>roviaes 
that it shall not be unlal·Jful for an ern?loyer to take any action othervlise 
prohibited '\,/here the differential is based on factors other than a'3e ••• '." 
'rhis issue is sure to surfac·= a':Jain, but until then, ~"'arkham shoulj be 
read '.lith tJreat Jefefence by .i1an-3-]e'!lent attorn.~ys. 
~ 
3. Hishon v. ~ing & Soal-:ling, 25 f-~PD paraCjraph 31,703 (n.c. N.D. Ga., 193J) 
The issue dealt .. lith in 'tishQn ',.1;35 .. hether ritle VII ?rinci?les a??ply 
to la,.] fit::fi part.n'2L's:1iq ~):>licies. 
1'ne ~)laintiff, -lisn0n, './35 not elevated to ,?artnershi? in jefent9ant 
la . .] firm. She clai;n2o that the denial !-las b!?c:~'Jse of sex in violation of Ti tIe 
VII. l'lle court ruled that ritle TVII did not :l.?ply. It rcas::>nea that Title \lII 
S?e3ks only in tenus of e:np1oyment relations and ~)r:.)hiiJi ts Jiscriinination 
,.jitt) cesgect to "co;np2nsation, ter:ns, e::>nditions or !?rivile:Jes .)E em~:)lol,:~entn 
Since the"Jord e.ii;>loyee in not defined in Title VII, t~le court 3?:~ars t::> have 
ruled that elevation to partnership is r'2ally ouying into the 2 ilployer status 
and therefore held the facts of this case ·..Jere not covered ':.Jy ritle VII. 
T:1e c,::>u:ct distinguishe:1 the case of Luci-:'io v. Cravath, S-,-laine & :'v1o:>re on 
the <;rounrls that th'? ;l1ain cO'fi!,)laint in that action ':las dischar;]e as an associate 
oeC3Llse of race and religion, issues ~Jhich the court 11el~ are clearly CCYJere1 
by 11itle vII. ··'ioreover, the court dis.nissed as r1ictu~n referenc-2 in LucL10 tt1at 
denial ';:)f prOii',otion to ?artnershi9 :night itself ~ a Ti tIe VII violati,:::>n. 
5'14. (U.S. Suprc;'ne Court, 1931) 
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.1.1'= 2ifth CirC'.lit ;y?ld t~1at t:1e c:?ferd,?tnt in a Title VII case Oears the 
JJ(',J~n of ;;roving by a ure~:::>JnJerance of the evijence the existance of 
,. 
leg i tLnate i1on-d iscri.l1inatory reasons for the employ;nent action and 
tnat the ·j~f(~ndant also must prove by objective evidence that tho::;e 
hired or )rOi'i\.:>ted ~Jere better qualified than the !?laintiff. 
'fhe COLlrt noted ,.,t.'1at in McIbnnel Ibuglas v. Green it had ruled that the 
r 
plaii1tiff has the buh3en of proving by the rre .. "Y)n,Jera;1Ce of the evidence a 
f>cima facie case of discrimination. Seconrl, if the plaintiff succeeas in 
pr·.:>ving the l?rirna facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate 
sO.ne le9itilnate, non-discriminatory reaSQn for tbe em;?loyee IS rej':ction". 
rhird, should the def-:ndant carry this btJraen, the ~')laintiff must then "lave 
an o~jf>Ort~nity to prove by a 9re;?:)!1(lerance of the eviJence that the le()itimate 
t-eas~ns offered 'oJy the defen:33nt -..lere not tcue reasons, but .. "ere a .?cetext for 
d isct-i:nina tion. 
TI1e Court, further, stated that the :1ature of the burJen that s:,ifts to 
the defen:1ant s~lould ue unJecstoo:3 in 1 i.~ht of tne plaintiff 1 s ul ti.r,at~ ard 
intennec1iate burd,=ns. The ul tirnate bur5=n of persuadin;) t~e trier of fact 
that the defen3ant intentionally discriminated atJainst the plaintiff ce:nains 
at all ti 1le ~vi th the plaintiff. 
!\ 2rilla facie case of disparate treat;nent is proven :,y plaintiff ?roving 
by a 9re~:onjeraiice of the evidence that she ap;>lie:.=l for an availa;)le !?osition, 
for .-lhich she .las qualified, :)ut ,-las rejecte::1 under cirCu,11stances ,lhic:l 'Jive 
rise to an inference of unI3 . .,Eul discri~ninatiC)n. The ::>rLna facie case raises 
an inference of rliscrirnination, str.ited t'1i? CO'Jrt, beca'Jse it pr~sll::1ed that 
c.:m,sideration of i'n~)'2r;liissible factors. ~sta'JI isi):i:':mt of the :,)ri na facie 
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o.J~ll.:r.-lf!Jlly discriminated a'J3inst t:,e ·~lnl~vee. If the trier of f?ict believ-:-5 
the plaintiff's evidence, and if the €m91-jyer is silent in the face of the 
!?resl1Enl?tion, tbe Court .i)I.lst Gnter jU;-:1')'2'Tll~nt for the plaintiff lY?cause no issue 
of fact relnains in the case. 
SHlprI~~G OF 'r~E BURDEN 
1 
l'ne iJlJraen that! shifts to the Jefen-Jant, stated the Court, is to rebut t:1e 
presll'n9tion of discrLnination by proJucing evidence tjat the plaintiff ,'/35 
rejected, or SO:ileone else preferred, for a legi timate, non-Jiscri:ninatory 
reason. rrhe c1efe:1dant does not, ho.vever, have to pecsuade the C.::>lll-t t,at it 
~.'35 actually iTlotivaterl !)y the proferrea reasons. It is s~fficient 
if the defeiYlant '5 evidence raises a genuine issu·? of fact as to ,..,hether it 
r]iscrirninated al)ainst the ?laintiEf. 'ro acc::>;ll?lish this, the -:1efendant :nust 
cl·2arly set forth, t:lrough the intro~lL1cti·:>n of a'.1inissible evidence, the reaS0ns 
for th~ ?laintiff's rejection. rne ex~l~~ation ~~ovidej must be legally 
sufficient to justify a judJement for the jefe:1::1ant. If toe defen3ant carries 
this Dur3en of proJlJction, the pc,=su;nption raised :Jy the ?riTn'~ facie case is 
rebuttej. 
The 0:Jrden tnen shifts 0ac~ to the ~laintiff. In Burdine, ?laintiff had 
to have the o;,Jport;J.ni ty to oenlOostrate that the proffere~ reason .. loS not the 
true reason for the e.nployn)ent decision. Tj1is ~uraen ;i1ergej \vi th the 
ul ti,nate b: .. n:jen of persuading the court that plaintiff has oeen t£1e victim of 
intentional uisccirnination. She may succ'.=ed in this either directly ~y pers1l3aing 
the court that a discri~ninatory reason :nDre likely :notivated th2 e:Tl?loyer or 
indirectly by s~:>,.lin9 that the employer' s proferre~ '?x~lan.~tion is un.vorthi' 
of creJel1ce. 
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'real v. ~tate o~ Connecticut, 25 EPD Para)ra?h 31,702 (2nd eire 19(11) 
_ The question presri=ntecl in this case was I,'lhether a plaintiff in a Title \!II 
case :iiay make a prima f~cie ShOtling of disparate im93ct based on the disparate 
results proouced by one portion of an employee selection process, 'vlhere the oottorn 
line reveals no Such i~?act. 
'rhe facts in this case.-1ere: !?laintiff, Teal, sou')ht to attain ?=cmanent 
~ 
status as a supervisor. To attain pec!nanent status, ?laintiff had to partici?ate 
in a selection ~rocess '.vhich re.],Jired, as the first step, a ~)assing score on 
a.vritten examination. Those candijates ~'lho pass the \..Jcittcn examination form 
an eligibility l.x>ol from \'lhich the appc>intin~ authori ty selects .. Jersons to fill 
the .. Jer,nanent positions. In making the final determinations the a .. )lJOintin.J 
authority considered the past vlork ;>erfor:n,::tnce of the candidates, reconmend3tions 
of the ca!1didates' supervisors, and the candidates' seni·::>rity. T..Iastly, in 
the final step of the process, the defendants employed an affirmative action 
program to insure a large re~)resentation of minority canjiiates O!1 the supervisory 
level. ;-jo',vever, only if a caniir,3te passe-J the :.·;citten examination a:1d enters 
the el igihil i ty ~l vloulc1 he ~ ex!?Osea to the rest of the selection !?rocess and 
thus ~nefit fro~ the consideration of these other factors. 
The a'.Jerage test scores of blacks .las substantially belO';1 that of ,vhites. 
fio.lever, because of the affirmative action pr03ra'Tl, t!1e bottOil line sho . .Jed that 
bl.~c'r"~ ~·Jece over represented in St.l?,~rvisory posi tions. 
,\t the district court, the court e·valuated the results of the selection 
i)rocess ui1der the four-fifths rule of the Uniform Guidelines of ;::'TI?loyee 
3election Procedures pre,?ared by the BE.)':. Ti1e fouc-fifths rule ?roviJes: 
II [a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic '-;3rOLl? '.1i1icn is less t::,an 
four-fifths (4/5) (or ei:jhty ,P2ccent) of the rate f:::>r the }r:::>up wi th ti1e 
highest rate '\'lill generally b2 regarjea ••• as evij'2nce of ·3:5verse i'l?act". 
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· w'in~le n~tin9 that the reslJlts of the '.o;citten te3t .)i,:3 not s.3tisfy the four-fift!1s 
nile, the Jistrict court conclu:=ler] th,)t the resul ts of the entic2 selt~ction 
[.Iroc-ess should be used to deter:nine "mether the pIa intiffs ha::3 ;nar]e out a 
pri'lla facie case of discrimination under the disparate i-1"l.;.act rule. Since the 
resul ts !,)f the entire selection proce~lure actually ';Jere :TlOre favorable to the 
black candidates than to the ~'lhite apr>licants, the court ais:nissen the plaintiffs 
action for failure tt ~rove a prLna facie case. 
:rhe a!?peals court rejected the nistrict courts ruling and held t~1at vlhere 
an in:3entifia~le pass/fail !:>arrier c3enies an eTl:)loyment 09?:::>rtunity to a 
Jis?r~p:>rtionately large nuroer of minori ties and prev'2nts the'll frQ1\ .?roceedin:J 
to the nt2xt step in the selection ~)rocess, that barrier is ,?rima facie 
discci:j\in3tory. In essence, the court rejecte:! the botton line conce;>t Ii/here 
tnere is a ~.:>arciec iy.:yond v/hich 3?p1icants CanrK)t :>=nr:trate. ".ihis a.?p<?ars to 
be a r~affir:n.;tnce of the n:>tion that anti-discri;ni:lation 1a';ls ~rotect 
injividLlals. That is to say, to the in1ividuals .Jho .Jid :lot pass the test 
it .vas irrelevant t!1at so;ne b13c~s ~'Jere f'ro~note1. T~1e c:>urt ap~)'2ars t:> have 
s.3ij that as individunls th~y have rights. 
(Su?reme Court, 1931). 
The:]uestion aecified in this case -"-13S :;'l!1ether an e:ilS'loyer held 1 ia~le for 
!:>3cki,Jay 02~ause collectively :)ar':3ained ',,,age :lifferentials .Jere fOIJnd to vi~late 
the 2~'Jal Pay t).ct and Title VIr has a fejeral statutory or c:>rnmon la.-1 ri]ht 
t·:> c0~tri:)lltion fro:r. uni8ns that alle~eily ::,ear at least ?artial res~!1sibility 
for the 5tatlJt::>ry violation3. 
The facts ,Jere: Contin'.lously fro:n 1947 throu(:Jh 1~74, ~1etitioner ?aid 
i1i-:],Jer .J3Jes to its ·liale ca:.Jin attendants, ·.Ji10,·Jer~ c1assifiej as ;;>urs'?cs, t;,an 
to its ie.nale c3~in attendants, vJho '\Jere classifie3 35 st·=',·lal-::12S5:?5. Dul.'"in3 
and eX2·.:::uted in r'2SpC>nse to union Jelnan;]s. 
In 1970', '.13. Laffey, a cabin .~tten13:1t e.TI.?1oi'ed oy :~:>rth.Jest Airlines 
CO.il:1t0nced a class action against !~orth~-1est challenging the legality of the 
".,a':le differential b2tween puesers and ste'.-lardesses.Jn :~ovem;Jer 12, 1973, 
the District Court issued an opinion in ·.vhich it found that the tVIO positions 
re''luirec1 eli.lal skill, effort, and res:xmsiJ:>ility and -,'Jere perfor;ned under 
similar vJorking condftions. Accordin-Jly, the court held that ~'Jorth\vest ha1 
~ 
violated ttle B1ual Pay Act an1 Ti tle VII an~ entered j'..lJg·=:nent in favor of th~ 
plaintiff class. Unless ~'1at ju.:33e:nent is reversed or mo3ifien, petitioner \-lill 
::>e re-1uired to pay in excess of 20 !nillion dollars in bac~pay, d~TlaJes, 3:1d 
interest to the :nembers of the Laffey class. 
After the entry of jUo:JJ'=lt1ent against it, petitioner filed a~)propriate 
motio:1s in the Laffey case asserting claLns for contributio!1 anJ ideiuoificution 
a]ainst the unions. 
On t~'le issue of a statutory eight to contribution, the court held that neithel:" 
ti1~ S-dual ?a.y ~ct nor ritle VII expressly creates a ri9ht to contci!:>ution in 
favor of em.?loyers. "·1oreover, the court held that there is no c'):nnon la~v 
ri)ht of contri~~tion. 
F. County of '';ashington v. Gunther, pJ.S. Su?re~e Court, JU:1e 8, 1901) 
(:-10. 30-429) 
The issue raised ~o/as "'lhether tl-)e ~ennett 1\;nend!nent f>rohibits a l'itle VII sex 
cO'-npensation clai!u ',,,here theilor'l-: ~:>erformed by the fe:71ales ... ·las n:>t sui:>stElntially 
e 1ual to .Jork [J2rfor.ned ~y .aales. 
Plaintiff, Gunther, filed suit against ::>etitioner all·~ginj, a-n':>n] others, 
to intentional sex discrLl1i!1ation. '.l'nis clai:n ,Jas ')3sed on a cl~i:n ta:lt, 
.)e.::aJse of int~nti()nal discri;nination, tne c-:xlnty set t~le _J3.y s'::31e f-:;r fe-r.ale 
cJuards, but not for male '9~lards, at .3 level lo.lel." than th3t .Jarr--3!1te::5 jy its o~..,n 
SiJcvey of oJtsiJe indL:~et5 arlj the ... "01:th of the job. 
i"'I 
-.,)-
;t trial, t~e District Court faun:l t 1 at the !ii.31e gU:ic,)S su?=rvisej :nore 
than 10 ti il'~s as .li':.tI1y prison2rs ;.::>Cc t.yJar,1 as did the f~:nale gLl3r.:Js, anj that 
the -fe,oales jev.Jted ,kich more of their tLne to less valuable clerical duties. 
It th~rt:fore held that the fe;nales jobs '.Jere not substanti31ly €!.:}ual to t.1-}.:>se of 
the male guards, and that respondents .-Jere thus not entitled to e-·1U.3l fJ.3.y. Toe 
District Court also dismissed respondents' clai~s that the discrepan=y in , 
?ay betvleen the ,nalel and fe:nale guarns '.vas attributa~le in :Jart to inteiltional 
sex discrimination. It held as a matter of la'w ~'1at a sex-oased ',·lage 
discri:nination clai:n cannot be broul~ht u!"'der Title VII unless it ~vouln satisfy 
the e1ual dork standard of the Squal Pay l\ct. The Court of 1\.??:=als reverse1, 
holding that persons alleging sex discrLnination u:ire not 9r~clu'led fco:n 
suing under Title VII to protest discril1inatory co~n?~!1sation pr.3ctices" 
merely beca'..lse their jobs ',Jere not equal to hi)her-paying jo~,)S held by 
me,rbers of the opposite sex. 
'rhe S\.l_Jrcme Court, in a 5-4 decision, stated that the issue tr2fore it ,..,35 
very na('(,0',4 an:] t!1at .-las: .-lOetner one can prove unJer 'ritle \iII by direct 
ev idence t.~at th:ir w'Jages we:re aepressed ~cause of intentional sex 
discrimination. 
The decision on this issue, of course, re-ilJired the G:>Llrt to deterrline 
'.lhat lirni t~tions the o'::1nett ~;ilendnent places on Title VII's otilervlise :)roaa 
:.)rohibitions a,)ainst sex -:liscri:nination. 
Ti tIe VII generally has broad ?rohi:)i tions aga ins t sex ,., iscri:-:1ination ',,,hich 
includes prohibitions a].3inst conpensatio:1 -iiscri:nination. 'rhe 3e:anett ;\.nen.5;nent, 
\·"hich is a section of Title VII, p!?cmits '~-Jage anrl con~J2nsation :iifferel1ces 
',lhece S:.lC;} ::1ifferences are It 3uthorizej" hy toe 8'-lual Pay ~ct. 
Ti)/2 ~q'Jal Pay T~ct, in eS.5ence, ,?rohibi ts ;?aY di fferen;::'~s ~x~se-J or. .sex for 
(i) a senioci ty system; (i i) a :n-=ri t syst(:mi (iii) a systen .lhich mea5U(,~S 
earnin]s by -luanti ty or ,1ual i ty of pt"S(luction; or (iv) a diff2re-ntial ;::>asGd 
on ~ly factor otner than sex. 
-9-
· .. 
Peti tit)n~r tl1:"CJ~ej that the purtx>se of the 3ennett ?'\!n::n:·lncnt .las to restrict 
Titte VII S~x-b3sed ·.va~e discrimination claims to those thr2t cou13 also be 
brought unil~r the E:lual ?ay ;ct, and thus that clai'Tls not arisin'3 fro,n 
ne.:]'Jal fNorklt are precluded. ~csp:>ndent, in contrast, argued that the Bennett 
j\:nend!ncnt~las designed merely to incorporate the four affirmative defenses of 
the E.:1Ual Pay Act info Title VII for sex-~3sed dage c1iscd;nination cl;tLns. 
Resp:>ndent thus contends that claLns for sex-based .. Jage jiscrimination can ~ 
bro!J'3bt lJ!"der Title VII even though no meln.~er of the opposite sex holds an 
e·1"..lal but higher paying j~b, provideii that the challengea dage rate is not 
t:>as~d on s,=niority, merit, quality or qu~ntity of pro1 lJction, or "any other 
factor other than sex". 
·r:'1e .Su~")re:ne Court ruled that the Sennett ~Tlend:nent incorp:>rates only 
t!le affir.native defenses of the E1u31 Pay :l\ct into Ti tIe VII. 
Peti ti0ner argued tbat this construction of the 3ennett ~ .. nen'J;nent ,-Jould 
ren~er it 5U?2rfloLls. ?etitioner clai:-ne::3 that the first three affir~13tive 
defenses are sLn,;>ly rejuna3nt of the pcovisions else:."here in :;703 (b) ,:,f Title 
VII that alreajy ex.empt bona fide seniority and rnerit syste!ns and syste.ns 
1~easuring earnings by ~uantity or quality of pro3uction, and that t~e fourth 
oefense, "any ot11er factor other than sex", is implicit in Title \Ill's general 
?rohibition of sex-based discrimination. 
'rhe Court disaCJre~a, stating: It [I]ncorfOration of the fourt~1 affir:native 
defe:1se could have significant cons'?:;lUt2:Jces for 'ritle VII liti3ation. 
Title VII's pro1-)i::>ition of .-Jiscriminatory e1l:;>loy:-aent ::>ractices ',J3S int~n:1ecl 
to be broa·-:1ly inclusi-ve, proscribing II not onl Y overt discri '"7li;)3ti')D '::>~t als:> 
:)ractices that are fair in form, but jiscci nin.~tor-y in o:;:>eratio:)". T:1-2 
fourth affirmative :'lef.?nse of the S.]1Jal Fay \ct, ilo,l:ver, .vdS )e.5i.ji1e.i 
Jifferently, to c.Jnfine the a??lic.3.tion of the \ct t·:) ·.-1:3'J'2 ,liff-?r'~nti315 
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1. Qu,?stion, involving a?plication of dis?:3ratei:npact theory to the ACS!\. 
2. .ZillEA.'s substantive prohibitions deriv~~ fro7n Title VII. 
3. Disparate Lnpact rule applies tol~.DE~. 
3. IIishon v. King & 3palding (D.C.:-l.D. Ga., 1980) 
1. S~~stion involvi~J coverage of Title VII to elevation to partner in 
law fir!l1. 
2. Partners are not em,?loyees of 13':1 firm. 
3. Elevation to ?artnership not covere~ by Title VII. 
c. 'fexas De?art:nent of CO;f:.nunity ?\ffairs v. :3urjine (~.S. SU? Ct., 1931) 
1. Question involving defenjants bucdl?n of pr00f aft!?r plaintiff :l·~S 'naje 
initi3l case of Jiscrimination. 
2. COljrt rejected Fifth Circuit's rule that defen:"1ant had to prove hy a 
preponJerance e>f evijence that nvn-oiscriminatory reasons existed. 
3. Defendants burden is to projuce evide:1ce that ?laintiff ',las rejected 
for legiti-nate, non-jiscri;ni:1atory reason • 
.I. Teal v. State of :onnecticut (2nd Cir., 1931) 
1. :.iuestion L'resented '.vas '.Jhether there is dis?3ratei:npact '.lhen O:1e 
element of .nulti-?3rt selection ?rocess has adverse im£J-3ct but "'l~ere 
b:>ttom line ShOtlS no il1pact. 
2. Court ruled that ~'lhere there is al1 injentifia~le pass/fail t>arrier \/lith 
an adverse imp3ct that is 9ri~a facie discrimination, re-~ardless of 
fact that :')Qtto~ line sho~'JS no impact. 
E. ~~orth'Nest Airlines v. Tt"ans~rt :-1orkers (S~:.>. Ct., 1931) 
1. juestion ?resented ':la5 ',vhether an effi?loyer found liable for discri'nination 
has C01l:uon la\"1 Ot" statutory right ta contt"i~ution fro1\ a union that Nas 
partially responsible for discrimin3tory ?rovisio~. 
2. G:>urt rulej that there is not a riJht to contribution un1er the CO;7\.fiOn 
la.l ,ri tIe VII, nor the E.:Jual Pay .~ct. 
F. County of ,\'ashin-Jton v. Gunth?r (SUL). Ct. 1931) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1\;1': issue raised .. las ,l11ether provisi::>n of ri tIe VIr t)rJhi:)i ts claim for 
intentional s-:x discri~llination '.:lnetn~r there ',las l1':)t a :Tlale 5:>ing 
si:nilar ·.Jork for liore 'Pay. 
Court, in narr~·.l ruling, hel~ that case of intentional sex .jiscri:-nination 
i.:~r;i1issiole unjer Ti tIe VIr even ti1o'J.jh there . .'2:S n0t a .ndle :Joing a 
si~ilar j00 for li\~re ?ay. 
Court ruled that Title VII's sex jiscri'ni~lati::>n ;>rovisions Ii ::itej .)'] the 
f.:>ur affirnative defenses of the 2'-1llal pay ~ct. 
• I 
I 
I I 
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